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  • MEV Redistribution via Public Auctions: Boosting DeFi Protocol Revenue . . .
    In the fast-evolving world of decentralized finance, MEV redistribution auctions are reshaping how protocols capture and share value As DeFi matures in 2025, Maximal Extractable Value, the profit from reordering or inserting transactions in blocks, once siphoned quietly by searchers and builders, now fuels protocol treasuries through transparent public auctions This shift not only boosts
  • Block Builder Decentralization is coming, but maybe not so soon - Substack
    The assumption is that a builder will provide incentives, such as MEV sharing, private transactions, and MEV backrun guarantees, to gather orderflow that others do not have access to, thereby producing higher-value blocks that consistently win the auction
  • How Modular MEV Auctions Revolutionize Orderflow Marketplaces for DeFi . . .
    Flashbots SUAVE: An Ethereum-native encrypted mempool designed to decentralize block building and maximize validator user rewards by protecting orderflow privacy Arrakis Finance DVMM: A decentralized market maker integrating MEV-aware mechanisms and orderflow auctions to return value directly to liquidity providers and traders
  • From Competition to Centralization: The Oligopoly in Ethereum Block . . .
    This paper employs empirical game-theoretic analysis to explore builders' strategic bidding incentives in MEV-Boost auctions, focusing on how advantages in network latency and access to MEV
  • The MEV Book
    The key takeaway here is that the extraction of MEV has created a competitive supply chain for user transactions, with many actors vying for a share of value Whenever a validator running MEV-boost is proposing a block, all transactions in that block have gone through at least one competitive auction (block level auction), usually two (searcher auction) and possibly even three (order-flow
  • Who Wins Ethereum Block Building Auctions and Why?
    To preserve Ethereum’s decentralized ethos and censorship resistance properties, fostering competition in the MEV-Boost block building auction is essential As a first step, we must understand the competitive edges of the dominant players
  • From Competition to Centralization: The Oligopoly in Ethereum Block . . .
    Abstract The Ethereum block production process has evolved with the introduction of an auction-based mechanism known as Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS), allowing validators to outsource block production to builders and reap Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) revenue from builder bids in a decentralized market In this market, builders compete in MEV-Boost auctions to have their blocks selected
  • How Cross-Chain MEV and Private Order Flow Disrupt Chain Abstraction
    MEV and private order flow disrupt chain abstraction’s vision to simplify multi-chain interactions by introducing chain-specific behaviors and risks For example, MEV extraction strategies and mitigation solutions vary across chains, making it difficult to abstract away these differences without sacrificing performance or security
  • How Modular MEV Auctions Enhance Transaction Efficiency in DeFi . . .
    As decentralized finance (DeFi) matures, the efficiency of transaction execution within blockspace markets is becoming a defining factor for both traders and protocols The rise of modular MEV auctions marks a pivotal shift in how value is extracted and distributed across blockchain networks, directly addressing inefficiencies that have long plagued DeFi ecosystems With Ethereum currently
  • Lecture #26: MEV - timroughgarden. org
    Priority gas auctions (PGAs) using transaction fees bids to compete for the first tx in a block
  • To Compete or Collude: Bidding Incentives in Ethereum Block Building . . .
    The block-building process on the Ethereum network has changed significantly with an upgrade of its consensus protocol Network participants access blocks through block building auctions at a decentralized financial market, termed builder market, where builders vie for the right to build blocks and earn Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) rewards
  • Exploring Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) | by T. J. Mensah | Medium
    The Evolution of MEV MEV has been part of Ethereum from the beginning, but its significance surged with the advent of DeFi and flash loans Initially, MEV extraction occurred through Priority Gas Auctions (PGA), where bots competed fiercely to outbid each other for profitable opportunities, leading to network congestion and high transaction fees Flashbots emerged as a solution to mitigate
  • How Modular MEV Auctions Are Transforming Transaction Ordering in DeFi
    In the fast-shifting world of decentralized finance (DeFi), transaction ordering is the invisible hand shaping user experience, security, and profitability For years, this process has been a battleground for sophisticated actors seeking to extract Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), often at the expense of regular users But a new paradigm is emerging: modular MEV auctions By systematizing and
  • From Competition to Centralization: The Oligopoly in Ethereum Block . . .
    Block production on the Ethereum blockchain has adopted an auction-based mechanism known as Proposer--Builder Separation (PBS), where validators outsource block creation to builders competing in MEV--Boost auctions for Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) rewards We employ empirical game-theoretic analysis based on simulations to examine how advantages in latency and MEV access shape builder





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